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Abstract
Several philosophers think there are important analogies between emotions and
perceptual states. Furthermore, considerations about the rational assessibility of
emotions have led philosophers—in some cases, the very same philosophers—to
think that the content of emotions must be propositional content. If one finds it
plausible that perceptual states have propositional contents, then there is no obvious
tension between these views. However, this view of perception has recently been
attacked by philosophers who hold that the content of perception is object-like. I
shall argue for a view about the content of emotions and perceptual states which will
enable us to hold both that emotional content is analogous to perceptual content
and that both emotions and perceptual states can have propositional contents. This
will involve arguing for a pluralist view of perceptual content, on which perceptual
states can have both contents which are proposition-like and contents which are
object-like. I shall also address two significant objections to the claim that emotions
can have proposition-like contents. Meeting one of these objections will involve
taking on a further commitment: the pluralist account of perceptual content will
have to be one on which the contents of perception can be non-conceptual.
1. Introduction
Several philosophers have been attracted to the view that there are significant analo-
gies between perceptual states and emotions.1 One attraction of this view is that
both emotions and perceptual states seem to be occurrent intentional states with
distinctive phenomenological properties. Since both perceptual states and emotions
are kinds of content-bearing state, and since the fact that they are both examples of
content-bearing states plays an important part in motivating the analogy between
them, one might wonder whether the analogy can be pushed further. In particular,
one might wonder whether there are significant analogies between the kinds of
content which emotions have and the kind of content which perceptual states have.
Some philosophers have thought that emotions have contents of a sort which
is appropriately described as propositional.2 If the analogy between perceptual
states and emotions holds good, and if one finds it plausible that perceptual states
have propositional contents, then this might be thought to provide some support
for the view that emotions have propositional contents. Unfortunately the view
that perceptual states have propositional contents has recently been subjected to
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vociferous criticism.3 If these criticisms are correct then philosophers of emotion
are apparently faced with two options: either play down—or simply abandon—the
idea that there are significant analogies between emotion and perception; or draw
back from the claim that emotions have propositional contents.
One might attempt to blunt this dilemma by suggesting that although there are
interesting analogies between these two kinds of state, the interest of the comparison
does not depend on emotions and perceptual states having precisely the same kinds
of content. The idea here would be to insist on the existence and fruitfulness of the
analogy while avoiding detailed examination of the kinds of content which either
emotions or perceptual states possess.4 However, this strategy seems somewhat lim-
iting. If we hope that the perceptual model of emotion will shed light on the nature
of emotions our discussions ought to make contact with the state of the art in phi-
losophy of perception. Unfortunately, much of the existing literature does not do so.
In this paper, I shall address issues about perceptual content ‘head-on’ by looking
in detail at the kind of account of perception which might be available to someone
who wanted to draw on the supposed analogy between emotion and perception,
and considering what kinds of views about the contents of emotion this would
commit us to. I shall argue that we can sustain the analogy between perception and
emotion, without giving up on the view that emotions have propositional content,
provided we adopt a particular view of perceptual content. I shall call this view a
‘Pluralist View’ of perceptual content.
On the Pluralist View, perceptual states can have more than one kind of content.
However, since there are a number of logically possible, but distinct views all of
which might lay claim to the title ‘Pluralist View’, more needs to be said about
what kind of pluralism is in question here. I shall argue that, the sort of theory of
perception which we are likely to need in this context will need to be pluralistic in
two different ways. First, it will need to be pluralistic with respect to the logical
form of the contents of perception: it will be a view on which perceptual states can
have both contents which are proposition-like and contents which are object-like.
Secondly, the account will need to be pluralistic about the kinds of propositional
content perceptual states can have: it will have to allow for both conceptual and
non-conceptual forms of propositional content.
I have said that we will need a view on which perceptual states can have more than
one kind of content. This formulation is ambiguous. We might want to distinguish
between ‘Weak Perceptual Pluralism’ and ‘Strong Perceptual Pluralism’. ‘Weak
Perceptual Pluralism’ is the claim that different perceptual states can have different
kinds of contents, but no single state can have more than one kind of content.
‘Strong Perceptual Pluralism the view that what we intuitively regard as a single
perceptual state—say, the state that I am in when I am looking at a bowl of flowers
in front of me—may have several different kinds of content.
The view of perception that I am advocating is a version of Strong Perceptual
Pluralism; and the view of emotion that I take to be required by a serious defense
of the Perceptual Analogy involves the same kind of pluralism. However, I shall not
be arguing for a yet stronger claim, which one might call ‘Ultra-Strong Perceptual
Pluralism’: the view that every perceptual state must have all the different kinds
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of content which I distinguish. While this view may be true, I do not think that
someone who thinks there are analogies between emotional and perceptual content
need accept it; and there may be good reasons for denying it.
It is worth addressing one objection to Strong Perceptual Pluralism (and also
to its Ultra-Strong cousin) straight away. Someone might suppose that Strong Per-
ceptual Pluralism cannot be true on the grounds that a single perceptual state must
involve a single representation, and that a given representation can only have one
form of content. However, even if we grant the representationalist presuppositions
of this objection, the objection itself does not seem to be obviously correct.5 In
order for it to go through we would need to suppose both that there is a way
of individuating ‘states’ on which a single state can only involve a single kind of
representation; and that no other way of individuating states is legitimate. It may
well be that if we grant the representationalist presuppositions of the objection (as
I have suggested we should), there is no space for objecting to the first of these
presuppositions. Nevertheless, the second seems highly questionable. There may be
all sorts of reasons, from the point of view of both science and common sense, why
we may want to individuate perceptual (and emotional) states in a more coarse-
grained way, and in particular one which allows for the possibility of a single state
having more than one kind of content.
2. Clarificatory and Strategic Remarks
First, some preliminary remarks. I start by emphasizing that the question I am most
interested in for the purposes of this paper is a conditional one. In other words, I am
interested in knowing what kinds of view of perceptual and emotional content we
would be committed to if the analogy between perceptual and emotional content
held good. I am also interested in knowing whether the views of content that we
would be committed to are sustainable.
These questions matter for two reasons. The idea that there is an analogy between
emotional and perceptual content of the sort that I am interested in seems a
reasonable bet, in the light of the other kinds of analogies between the two sorts
of state which I shall discuss in section 3. But we might wonder whether there is
any reason for thinking that exploration of this analogy is likely to be fruitful: in
other words, whether it is likely to point us in the direction of facts about emotion
and perception that we would have been less likely to discover without exploring
the analogy. If there was a close relationship between the kinds of content which
emotions and perceptual states can have, this would be a good reason for thinking
the analogy likely to be fruitful
Moreover, whether or not the analogy turns out to be a fruitful source of ideas
about the emotions we shall see that exploring the analogy points us towards a
view of perceptual content whose possibility we might otherwise overlook: This
is the ‘Pluralist View’, which I introduce in section 5 below. While I shall not try
to provide a full-scale defense of this view in this paper, I taking that drawing
attention to the possibility of a view of this sort and articulating it in some detail
is nonetheless a worthwhile achievement.
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In what follows I shall attempt to achieve the following goals. First, to give a clear
articulation of the kind of view of perceptual content to which someone who was
committed to the analogy between emotion and perception would need to accept.
Secondly, to say something substantive about what might motivate a view of this
sort. Thirdly to show that the kind of pluralism about perceptual content required
is a viable theoretical option, and in particular it is not ruled out by arguments
which have already been advanced in the philosophy of perception literature.
It is worth noticing that achieving the first of these goals would be significant
even if it turned out that the sort of pluralism about perceptual content that the
analogy calls for can be shown to be untenable. For this would tell us either that the
perceptual analogy was not viable, or that it was less illuminating than one might
initially hope. And that might, perhaps suggest that the perceptual analogy might
need to be supplemented by alternative approaches. While they may seem modest,
these goals are not negligible
3. Perceptual Views of Emotion
Several authors have explored the idea that there are significant analogies between
emotions and perceptual states.6 Andrea Scarantino has recently argued that it is
perhaps the most plausible formulation of the underlying insight of a whole family
of views which label themselves ‘cognitivist.’7 With that in mind, let us review some
of the more striking considerations in its favour.8
As we have already noted, emotions are typically taken to have both inten-
tional and phenomenological properties. Some views, often characterized as ‘add-
on’ views, account for emotions’ possession of these two kinds of property by
assigning these properties to different components (for example, to a belief and an
associated non-intentional sensation or feeling).9 Thus for example, grief might be
characterized as involving a belief that one has suffered a great loss accompanied by
sensations of either mental or physical disturbance; anger as involving a belief that
one has been insulted, together with a set of sensations characteristic of anger, and
so on.10 Views of this sort are widely thought to be unsatisfactory.11 One reason
for this, stressed by Robert Roberts, is that such accounts seem not to do justice
to the ways in which emotions present themselves to those who experience them as
unitary states.12
An alternative might be to regard emotions as being a particular species of
desire.13 Thus, for example, anger might be conceived of as a desire for retaliation;
grief as a desire for something that is known to be lost and so on. It speaks in favour
of this view that desires are unitary states which seem to have both a phenomeno-
logical and intentional properties. Nevertheless, this account is less appealing than
it might at first seem. Notice that we can distinguish between a purely motivational
conception of desire, and a conception of desires which is phenomenologically rich.
The phenomenologically rich conception is the one which we need to appeal to
in this context. However, in the absence of a clear and independently-motivated
account of how desires come to have phenomenological properties, one might sus-
pect that phenomenologically rich desires acquire their phenomenological richness
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only via their association with emotions. If so, then drawing an analogy between
emotions and desires seems unlikely to be illuminating.14
Perceptual accounts of emotion provide an attractive alternative to views of both
sorts. For perceptual states provide a good model of a kind of state which has both
intentional and phenomenological properties and in which the state’s possession
of the two kinds of properties is not normally thought of as being best accounted
for by decomposing the state into separate components, one bearing one kind of
property and another bearing the other.
Perceptual views of emotion also seem to do justice to our apparent passivity
with respect to emotional states. This passivity is reflected in the historical use of the
term ‘passions’ to refer to emotions; and also in some of the language that we find
it natural to use about emotions. We speak of being ‘overcome’, ‘overwhelmed’ or
even ‘swept away’ by strong emotions, and rarely think of them as being themselves
the result of deliberation.15 It is natural to think of perception as passive: we can
choose what we see only insofar as we can choose what we look at.16 Perception
contrasts with some other kinds of mental state here. We can shape our beliefs and
at least some of our desires, not only by our choice of what to think about, but
also via deliberative decision-making.17 For example, we can weigh up the evidence
which bears on a particular question with a view to deciding which answer to it is
correct. We can also survey a variety of different possible goals, and decide which of
them we wish to make our own. Explaining how this is possible is philosophically
challenging. Nevertheless the phenomenon seems real enough. At any rate, we rarely
speak of ourselves as being overcome by a belief.18
4. Emotions and Their Propositional Contents
The case that I shall be making for thinking that an advocate of the perceptual
analogy should adopt a pluralistic view of perceptual content will depend heavily
on the idea that we should think of emotions as having propositional contents. If
the case for this depended on a prior commitment to the perceptual analogy there
would be a risk of circularity here.
However, there are reasons for holding that emotions have propositional contents
which do not depend on the perceptual analogy. For example, it seems plausible
to regard at least some emotions as responses to situations or states of affairs, and
that these responses can be either warranted or unwarranted. If I am scared by the
large furry dog that comes bounding towards me as I am out for a walk in the
evening, this maybe appropriate, if the dog is in some way a danger to me. Equally,
if the dog is in no way dangerous, but simply wants to play, then my fear may be
inappropriate. So it may well seem plausible to think of my fear as being a state
which represents the world as being a certain way: in particular as being a way
which would make the emotion which I am feeling appropriate. So one might see
the fear here as having as its content that the dog in front of me is dangerous, or
liable to harm me.19
On a view like this, the propositional content of an emotion is to be identified
with the state of affairs which makes, or would make, the emotion appropriate.
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On this account of propositional content, there is no straightforward inference to
be made from the fact that someone is experiencing an emotion with a particular
content to their being able to articulate that content. It is possible to be afraid of
dogs without being able to talk about dogs or about danger, or about harm.
Considerations of this sort have sometimes led philosophers to identify emotions
with beliefs or judgments.20 This identification is implausible. My fear of a dog
can last long past the point at which I am convinced that it poses no danger to
me. Such fear may be ill-founded; but it is not imaginary, and it can persist, in
a way that beliefs typically do not, even in the face of a directly countervailing
belief. Furthermore, I can recognize that someone else has emotions which are at
odds with their beliefs without this threatening the coherence of the rest of the
propositional attitudes which I ascribe to them; whereas this seems more difficult
when circumstances lead me to attribute two directly contradictory beliefs.21
Although it is implausible that emotions are beliefs we should not abandon
the idea that emotions have propositional contents. There are kinds of mental
state other than beliefs that can have propositional contents. On many accounts
of perception, perceptual states also have propositional contents.22 Furthermore,
on at least some of those accounts the propositional content of a perceptual state
is given by its accuracy conditions, in a way which is analogous to the way in
which the propositional content of an emotion can be given by its appropriateness
conditions.23
Nor should we abandon the view that emotions have propositional contents
simply because there are emotions such as love and hate for which it is harder to
find propositional contents than it is for fear. One possibility to consider is that
different kinds of emotions have different kinds of content. On this view, some
kinds of emotions would have persons or other kinds of objects as their focus while
others would have situations. This would require us to take a pluralist view of the
contents of emotion. The kind of pluralism that would be required here would be
analogous to what I have called ‘Weak Perceptual Pluralism’. But a view analogous
to Strong Perceptual Pluralism would also be consistent with the phenomena. This
is fortunate since, as we shall see in what follows, there is a reasonably good case
to be made for Strong Perceptual Pluralism.
5. Perceptual Content—Propositional, Object and Pluralist Views
Advocates of the perceptual analogy who hold that (some) emotions have proposi-
tional contents face a problem, unless they can defend the view that perceptual states
have such contents. However, this view, which I shall call ‘Propositional View of
Perceptual Content’ or ‘The Propositional View’ is extremely controversial.24 Promi-
nent opponents of the Propositional View include Charles Travis,25 Anil Gupta,26
John Campbell,27 and Bill Brewer.28 Many, though not all of these authors accept
as an alternative to The Propositional View what one might call ‘The Object View
of Perceptual Content’ or ‘The Object View’. According to the Object View we
must make room for the idea that perceptual states have particular objects—items
which do not have a propositional structure—as their contents.29 We must also
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accommodate the idea that they do so in a way which we might call ‘underivative’:
that is to say, on the Object View, it is not the the case that objects are contents
of perception in virtue of their featuring in propositions which are the content of
perception.30
The Propositional View and the Object View are often regarded as being mutually
exclusive. However, on the characterizations which I have given of them, there is
no reason why they must be.31 In the absence of further argument, there is no
immediate reason to rule out the possibility that perceptual states might have more
than one kind of content, and in particular that they might have both propositional
and (non-dervivatively) objectual contents. Call views of this sort ‘Pluralist Object
Views’.
The Pluralist Object View is one possible position in logical space. It is natural to
wonder whether there might be any positive reason for it. If not, then considerations
of parsimony might rule it out. Here are two reasons for taking it seriously.
The first is phenomenological. The Object View is sometimes thought to be lent
plausibility by the fact that in perception we are presented with objects directly.
However, it seems equally plausible to say that in perception we are presented, not
simply with objects, but with objects as being a certain way and standing in certain
relationships to one another and to us—in other words, with states of affairs, or
judgeable contents in which objects figure. Furthermore, one might go on to say
that which of these phenomenological facts seems most salient to us may well
depend on the particular kind of perceptual experience we choose to focus on. It
seems particularly plausible to think of perception as presenting us with objects
directly when we are thinking of the role which perception plays in engaged action.
Here, plausibly, perception puts me in direct contact with particular objects. But
when I am simply surveying the scene in front of me in a disengaged way—as it
might be from the philosopher’s arm-chair—then things are different. Or so one
might think.32
Considerations from the psychology of perception might also be taken to count
in favour of the Pluralist Object View—or at least to undermine the force of con-
siderations of parsimony. On one well-supported view, vision involves two separate
streams of information, one dorsal and one ventral. On accounts of this sort, the
ventral stream is involved in perception for action and the dorsal stream supports
the inputs of vision to speech-processing and memory.33 The distinctness of these
channels of visual processing can be taken to be demonstrated by a variety of
phenomena. One of the more striking is the existence of illusions of size in which
individuals who are asked to make comparative verbal judgments of the compara-
tive size of a set of circles give incorrect responses, but have no difficulty at all in
adjusting their hand to the appropriate size in order to grasp the circles.34
Any plausible account of what is going on in subjects of this sort is likely to
need to postulate the existence of distinct visual representations, one serving as an
input into speech and the other into grasp. It does not follow, of course, that these
representations must take different forms. But given that they perform different
roles and appear to encode different kinds of information it is far from clear why
we should expect them to be representations of the same kind. At very least this
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seems to count against the idea that considerations of parsimony tell us that there
is likely to be only one form of visual representation. They appear to establish a
case for taking seriously the possibility that there might be perceptual contents of
different kinds.
It is worth noticing that the view I have outlined is compatible with a fairly
common argumentative strategy which is employed by advocates of the Object
View. This is to argue that the fact that perception is directed at particular objects
plays an ineliminable role in vindicating a certain intuition or explaining a certain
phenomenon.35
6. Arguments Against Propositional Views (1): Anil Gupta
Arguments which are aimed at showing that perceptual states cannot have proposi-
tional contents present more of a challenge for Pluralist Object Views. Anil Gupta
and Charles Travis have both put forward arguments of this sort.36
Call the claim that perceptual states have propositional contents the ‘Proposi-
tional View’. Gupta holds that the Propositional View, taken together with two
further claims, which he calls the ‘Equivalence Constraint’ and the ‘Reliability
Constraint’, leads to skepticism and that this constitutes a reason for rejecting
the Propositional View.37 Gupta formulates the Equivalence Constraint and the
Reliability Constraint as follows:
Equivalence Constraint: ‘The given in subjectively identical experiences is the same’
Reliability Constraint: ‘The given in an experience never contains a false judgment—i.e.
a false proposition.’38,39
For the purposes of this paper, I shall assume that Gupta is right to think that
the Propositional View taken together with these two constraints entails a skeptical
conclusion, and also that if a combination of views entails a skeptical conclusion
that gives us a reason to reject at least one of them. Even if we concede this we do
not yet have a compelling reason for rejecting the Propositional View. We might
choose to reject either the Equivalence Constraint or the Reliability Constraint
instead. I shall argue that we have at least as much reason to reject the Reliability
Constraint as the Propositional View.40
Two points Gupta makes which might be thought to support the Reliability
Constraint should be discounted in this context. First, Gupta argues that the Re-
liability Constraint is consistent with the claim that our everyday judgments of
perception, judgments such as ‘there is now a table in front of me’, are sometimes
false.41 Gupta thinks this is true because he thinks that such judgments are not
part of what he is calling ‘the given’. This is because, on his view, the given does
not include judgments. But whether or not this is true is precisely what is at issue
between those who agree and those who do not agree with the Propositional View.
If the Reliability Constraint is taken to figure in the case against the Propositional
View, the falsity of the Propositional View cannot be presupposed as part of an
argument for the Reliability Constraint.
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Gupta’s claim that ‘from the phenomenological point of view, judgments are not
the given in experience’ should also not be counted as part of the best case for
the Reliability Constraint.42 I have already argued in section 6 that the account of
perceptual phenomenology that Gupta is appealing to here is at best controversially
one-sided. If one considers the variety of possible perceptual experiences, both
engaged and contemplative, one will find some perceptual experiences in which
perceptual judgments do seem to be part of what is given in perception and others
in which they do not.
Gupta’s most significant argument in favor of ‘Reliability’ is based on two claims.
The first is that ‘experience is passive’. The second is that ‘it is always a good policy
not to assign fault to the passive.’43 Gupta’s remark that this is a matter of ‘good
policy’ seems hard to parse. What is at issue here is not ‘what is good policy?’
but ‘what is true?’; or at least ‘what is conceptually coherent and metaphysically
possible?’ Suppose, however, we agree both that we are passive in experience,44 and
also that it is a mistake of some sort to assign fault to the passive. These claims on
their own are not enough to establish that the Reliability Constraint is true.
In order to have an argument for the Reliability Constraint, we need some way of
getting from the claim that experience involves no fault to the claim that it cannot
involve a false judgment. One way of doing so would be if we thought that false
judgment does have to involve fault. If we do think so, then in the light of his claim
that ‘it is . . . a good policy not to assign fault to the passive’ we are presumably
committed to the view that false judgment is not passive (or, perhaps, not purely
passive.)
If these exegetical suggestions are correct, then Gupta’s argument for the Reli-
ability Constraint might be formulated as follows: False judgment involves fault;
fault only makes sense when we are not purely passive; we are purely passive in
experience; therefore experience cannot involve false judgment.
This argument seems to presuppose, without argument, that experience cannot
have the same sort of content as judgment without being a judgment. As I have
already noted, this point is controversial.45 However, let us put this to one side.
If we can say that any mental process where we are not purely passive involves
an active capacity, it follows from the first two premises of this argument that
false judgment always involves an active capacity.46 There are only two ways in
which this could be true. One would be if judgment itself always involved an active
capacity. The second would be if judgment did not always involve such a capacity,
but false judgment did. However, it is difficult to make sense of the second of
these possibilities. The possibility of falsity in a judgment seems to depend on
the relationship between judgment and a mind-independent world, not between
judgment and the will. So we are left with the first possibility: judgment always
involves an active capacity.
We might think that if Gupta is committed to the view that judgment always
involves an active capacity this commits him to a controversial form of doxastic
voluntarism.47 However, he could conceivably be committed to a weaker view—
namely that when we are making a judgment we need to decide whether or not to
accept a given contentful item.48 Even this seems somewhat implausible. There are
284 NOUˆS
at least some occasions on which we seem to make judgments involuntarily. When I
walk into the kitchen, see some unwashed dishes and say to myself ‘There’s a terrible
mess in here’, the judgment itself seems to be wrung from me by the situation
itself, and not something which presents itself as a possible judgment calling for
either endorsement or rejection. This point does not seem to be undermined in
any way by the further observation that a moments reflection might lead to a
calmer, more relaxed judgment in which the content ‘a terrible mess’ did not occur
at all.
In any case there is a more serious problem with Gupta’s case for the Reli-
ability Constraint. If my reconstruction of his position is correct, Gupta’s case
depends on the premise that false judgments always involve some kind of fault.
Gupta gives no arguments for this premise. However, it is by no means obvious
that it is true. Pre-theoretically, one might well think that there can be faultless
errors and that some errors in perceptual judgment, such as mistaking a person
for their twin sibling, would provide us with examples of precisely such faultless
errors.
Here is an argument for the claim that there can, in fact, be faultless false
judgments. Consider the case of inferential judgments. We sometimes make false
judgments as a result of making inferential mistakes. But not all such mistakes
need involve fault. Consider, for example a case where I need to perform a complex
arithmetical operation in a situation where I have limited memory resources. It
might be impossible for me to avoid making a mistake. But I can’t be at fault for
doing something it is impossible for me to avoid. (If it is a bad idea to blame the
passive, then it is surely also a bad idea to require the impossible.) If this is true
there can be faultless inferential errors. We would not regard this as reason for
thinking that a belief which was formed as a result of such an error did not have a
propositional content.
Gupta might retort that I have not come up with an uncontroversial case of
a false perceptual judgment that does not involve fault. That is true. Given what
is at issue, it is highly unlikely that it will be possible to come up with any such
cases which are uncontroversial. Instead, I have argued that Gupta is wrong to
think that false judgment must always involve fault. Since Gupta appears to derive
his conclusions about perceptual judgments from considerations about judgment
in general, it follows that if there is no reason to think that false judgment must
involve fault in the general case, we have not been given a good reason for taking it
to be true in the particular case of perceptual judgments. This undermines Gupta’s
case for the Reliability Constraint, and hence his case against the Propositional
View.
7. Arguments Against Propositional Views (2): Charles Travis
Charles Travis has also argued that perceptual states cannot have propositional
contents.49 He does so by considering a number of possible examples of statements
which might be candidates for expressing the content of a particular state, and
arguing that none of these statements can do so. In particular he argues that if
The Contents of Perception and the Contents of Emotion 285
perceptual states have propositional contents, the content of those states must be
expressible as a statement about how things look.50
Travis then argues that such ‘looks’ statements can be interpreted in one
of two ways, which I shall call the ‘inferential disposition’ and ‘looking like’
interpretations51 The first of these interpretations has two slightly different uses. It
can be used to report a disposition to draw a certain inference on the part of a
particular person. When I say that Sid looks to me, or to his partner, as though
he is drunk, I am reporting that I, or Sid’s partner is inclined to conclude that Sid
is drunk on the basis of visual evidence. It can also be used to make a ‘deperson-
alized’ version of the same kind of claim. Travis suggests that claims of this sort
collapse into claims about a particular state’s being (merely) information-bearing
and that claims of this sort are not fully representational.52 That is to say, on this
interpretation, there is no room for misrepresentation—if Sid is not drunk then it
is a mistake to say that he looks as though he is.
On an alternative way of construing them, the statements about how things
look will be what one might call ‘looking-like statements’. Travis suggests that such
statements will not serve the purposes of an advocate of the Content View, because
they cannot uniquely specify the content of the state in question.53 This is because
any statement about how things look is capable of being true even when things are
not actually the way they look. So, for example, if the shirt in front of me looks blue,
it may in fact not be a single-hued blue, but a pointilliste me´lange that gives the
impression of being blue, or a white shirt dipped in quick-fading dye (the examples
are Travis’s).54 Furthermore says Travis, if the way things look is compatible with
their being some other way, then they also look to be either the way they were
initially specified as looking or the way they are.55 So for example, if the shirt in
front of me looks blue, but it is compatible with the way it looks that it has been
dipped in quick-fading dye, then it looks to be either blue or recently dipped in
rapidly-fading ink.
Travis suggests that advocates of the view that perceptual states have proposi-
tional content should prefer the first of these ways of expressing the content of a
‘looks’ statement to the second. However, it is not clear that he is right about this. It
is worth noticing that his argument against the second way of interpreting ‘looks’
statements seems far from conclusive. Even if we grant Travis that a white shirt
which has been dipped in rapidly-fading dye is not a blue shirt, it is not entirely
obvious that we should also grant him that it follows from the fact that the shirt in
front of me looks blue is compatible with its having been dyed in rapidly-fading ink
in front of me, the shirt looks (to have been) dipped in rapidly fading blue ink.56
One might think that the shirt would have to look very different to look that way.57
However, there is a more serious problem with Travis’ argument here. His argu-
ment seems to depend on the assumption that if perceptual states have propositional
contents, those contents must be verbally specifiable in ways which pick them out
uniquely. Call this the ‘Expressibility Constraint’.
EC: If a state has propositional content then there is some form of words which can be
used to specify that content uniquely.
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The Expressibility Constraint is more controversial than one might suppose. On
some accounts of perception, perceptual states can have a content which is propo-
sitional but non-conceptual.58 As I shall argue in section 8, someone who accepts
an account of perception of this sort has no reason to accept the Expressibility
Constraint.59
One might resist this line of argument by suggesting that the Expressibility
Constraint was true by definition. On an account of this sort, a state would have
propositional content if and only if there was some form of words which could be
used to specify its content.
There are two points to make about this suggestion. First, we should notice
that this is not the only way in which we might understand the notion of the
propositional content of a perceptual state. When I introduced the notion of a
perceptual states having propositional content I did so by talking of the state’s
accuracy conditions. It is not obvious that it follows from a state’s having accuracy
conditions that there must be some form of words which could be used to state
those conditions. Furthermore, if Travis’ arguments show that perceptual states
cannot have propositional contents when the notion of propositional content is
understood in such a way as to make the Expressibility Constraint definitive of
what it is for a state to have propositional content, but do not show that perceptual
states cannot have propositional contents when the notion of propositional content
is understood along the lines of the accuracy view, then his arguments cannot
constitute an objection to the pluralistic account of perceptual content which I am
advocating here.
8. Rejecting Expressibility
The idea that perception might have a non-conceptual content has been extensively
discussed over the past two decades.60 The view is controversial, and I shall not try
to address all the objections which have been made to it. For my purposes, what
matters is that the view is still a live theoretical option.
I start by making a number of points that are, by now, quite well-known. The
first is that to attribute to a subject a perceptual state which has a certain propo-
sitional content is not obviously and immediately to attribute to her or him the
conceptual capacities that we use in picking out that state. In other words it seems
at least imaginable someone could be in a perceptual state whose content we would
most naturally characterize using certain concepts while themselves lacking those
concepts. States which have contents of which it is true that the occurrence of a
concept in their characterization does not entail that the individual who is in that
state has the concept in question are states with non-conceptual contents.61
There are a number of different reasons why the idea that perceptual states have
non-conceptual content has seemed appealing.62 One, stressed in a number of early
papers on the non-conceptual content of perception by Christopher Peacocke is
the thought that the content of perception sometimes has a property which we
might call ‘Inexpressibility’. The content of a perceptual state is inexpressible when
it outruns any concepts which we have. Consider, for example, the experience of
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looking at a particular serrated autumn leaf. In many cases such a leaf will both
have, and appear to have, a shape which is, when considered in detail, distinct from
the shape of other serrated leaves.63
On Peacocke’s view the content of perception will have as a part that the leaf has
the particular shape which it does have. Part of the reason for taking the content
of this state to be non-conceptual is precisely that in many cases we will not have
a word, or a set of words, with which we can express the exact shape of the leaf.
Furthermore, the content has accuracy conditions: the leaf may turn out to have
a very different serrated shape from the shape I took it to have—for example, if I
have mistakenly taken it to have an edge somewhere where it is merely occluded by
another leaf. So even where content is non-conceptual, it can still be propositional
in the sense which I have used that term.64
Elsewhere, Peacocke has suggested that it is helpful to distinguish between two
kinds of non-conceptual content, which he refers to as ‘scenario content’ and
‘proto-propositional content.’65 Protopropositional contents are contents whose
individuation conditions are, in Michael Tye’s word, fine-grained.66 In other words,
the contents of such states may be distinct, even when they have the same correct-
ness conditions. In arguing for this possibility Peacocke invites us to consider two
possible perceptual experiences: one of a square with two of its sides parallel to
the ground, and one of a square standing on its corner. One might describe these
experiences as being the experiences of having a square in front of one and that of
having a diamond in front of one. The contents of such experiences are, as Peacocke
suggests distinct. Nevertheless, it is arguable that they have the same correctness
conditions, since there is a square in front of one if and only if there is a regular
diamond in front of one.67
If this is right, then the individuation conditions of non-conceptual perceptual
states must be more fine-grained than that of correctness conditions. Michael Tye
has argued that it is not correct. Tye finds it puzzling how states which are non-
conceptual could nevertheless have the same fineness of grain as conceptual states;
and he thinks that it must be possible to account for the differences in experience
between perceiving a square and perceiving a diamond by appealing to possibilities
such as seeing the diamond as a square which is tilted and the square as a square
which is not tilted.68 However, what is important for my purposes is what Tye and
Peacocke agree about here—namely that the content of these experiences must be
one which has correctness conditions—and not what they disagree about. What
they are in agreement about is the existence of (what I am calling) propositional
non-conceptual contents.
The upshot of this discussion is that someone who thinks that perceptual content
can be non-conceptual will not take it as read that if perceptions have contents
those contents must be expressible by us. However, we need to be careful what this
argument does and does not seek to establish and how it does so. One point to note
is that Peacocke does not take the fact that we do not have a word for a particular
shape to be constitutive of our not having a concept of that shape. Concepts, for
Peacocke, are to be identified with patterns of inferential dispositions. The point
about language is simply to make it seem plausible that, in the case of this particular
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shape we do not have a pattern of inferential dispositions which would constitute
having the concept of this shape. (If the argument is successful the most it can
do is to make this plausible: it seems that it would be possible to have a stable
pattern of dispositions constitutive of the concept ‘oval’, say, without having any
word synonymous with the word oval in one’s vocabulary.)69
Furthermore, saying that a particular individual does not have words which
would enable her or him to express the content of a particular state is not to say
that that state fails to meet the Expressibility Constraint. For it is perfectly possible
that some other individual might possess a vocabulary which is sufficiently rich to
enable them to articulate the content of the experience I am having when I see the
serrated leaf, even though I do not.
Nevertheless, the fact that an individual can be in a perceptual state which they
do not have the vocabulary to articulate does raise a problem for Travis. Travis needs
to hold that in such cases, the content of my perceptual state is one which someone
else might be able to state. But in cases where the perceiver is not able to express the
content of their perceptual state, what reason is there for thinking that some other
speaker might be able to? There seems to be very little, other than blind faith, that
such a conviction could rest on. And a convincing argument against the view that
perceptual contents can have propositional contents must rest on something more
than blind faith.70
9. Non-Conceptual Content in Emotion
Even if the claim that perceptual states can have propositional contents can be
saved from Travis’ objections provided we accept the existence of non-conceptual
propositional contents, this will only seem helpful to an advocate of the Perceptual
Analogy to the extent that she or he finds it plausible that emotional states are also
capable of having non-conceptual content. Someone who does not is unlikely to
find themselves able to sustain the view that perceptual contents are interestingly
analogous to emotional ones. For the analogy to hold up, the contents of emotions
will need to be at least partly non-conceptual as well.
Fortunately, a number of authors, have recently defended the view that emotional
states are analogous to perceptual states insofar as they too have non-conceptual
contents.71 One reason for holding this view takes off from an interesting parallel
between emotions and visual perception. As Tim Crane has pointed out, the fact
that certain illusions, such as the Muller-Lyer illusion, can persist even when we
know that they present the world to us in a misleading way, suggests that such
states are ones whose content is presented to us in ways that do not engage the
inferential capacities which would be involved in the attribution of a belief with the
same content.72 When in the Muller-Lyer illusion, we have a perceptual experience
of one line as being longer than another, we are not prevented from doing so by
our belief that the lines are of the same length (as we would if we formed a belief
with the same content). Crane further suggests that this is because these perceptual
experiences do not involve inferential capacities at all. Given a view on which
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concepts simply are inferential capacities, it follows that the content of such states
is itself non-conceptual.
Christine Tappolet and Sabine Do¨ring have both suggested independently, that
the phenomenon of persistent illusions in the perceptual case is paralleled by a
familiar phenomenon in our emotional lives—that of emotional recalcitrance.73
Emotional recalcitrance occurs in cases where we have emotions which appear to
be inappropriate, given the beliefs we have. An easily-evoked example is that of fear
of a situation which we know not to be dangerous—for example; fear of falling in
a situation in which we know ourselves to be well-supported. Tappolet and Do¨ring
suggest that the parallel between these cases and the case of persistent illusions give
us reasons to think that the content of illusions can be non-conceptual.
Other arguments for thinking that the content of perception can be non-
conceptual can be paralleled in the case of emotions. For example, it is sometimes
held that animals and very young children do not have the inferential capacities
which are—on this view—constitutive of concepts. If it makes sense to think of
them as nonetheless perceiving the world, then the contents of their perceptual
states must be non-conceptual contents. Similar considerations about the emotions
and inferential capacities of young children and animals might lead one to a similar
conclusion about their emotions.
Arguably, all of these reasons for taking emotions to have non-conceptual con-
tents rely on the idea that concepts are to be identified with certain kinds of
inferential capacity. This view of the nature of concepts is extremely controver-
sial. Jerry Fodor has criticized it trenchantly.74 Although I am not persuaded by
Fodor’s arguments, here are two points which might be worth addressing to those
who are. One purely ad hominem response to this is that even Fodor has recently
been prepared to concede that some instances of visual perception may involve
non-conceptual content.75
A further response is that there is at least one line of argument for thinking
that emotions have non-conceptual contents which does not seem to rely on taking
concepts to be inferential capacities. David Pugmire has recently suggested that
considerations about the ineffability of emotional content might also lead one to
suppose that emotions also have non-conceptual contents.76 He argues that our
difficulties in finding verbal expressions which are adequate to the contents of
our emotions might best be explained by taking them to have unconceptualised
contents. This argument, which parallels Peacocke’s argument from the richness of
perceptual content to the existence of non-conceptual perceptual contents, does not
appear to presuppose an inferentialist view of concepts.
Are the points which I am making here are in tension with the reasons that
I gave in section 4 for thinking that emotions have propositional content? Those
arguments depended on the idea that emotions are rationally assessable. The idea
that non-conceptual content can be rationally assessable is controversial. So one
might think that arguments for the view that emotions have non-conceptual content
undermine the case for thinking that they have propositional contents.
However, this objection ignores one of the key features of my account: namely
that it is a pluralist account. As I emphasized in section 2, I understand this to mean
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that states which we intuitively characterize as a single emotional or perceptual state
can involve more than one representation, and that the representations which they
involve can be of more than one kind.
So the account leaves room for the possibility that a given emotional state
might include both a conceptual representation (in virtue of which it is rationally
assessable) and a non-conceptual one. (Thus, for example, my being afraid of a dog
on a particular occasion may involve my having several representations of different
sorts, some of which will be conceptual and some non-conceptual).
However, we should also notice that the objection can also be answered with-
out appealing to this feature of my account. To see why, it is helpful to recall a
distinction which Jeff Speaks has made between ‘relatively’ and ‘absolutely’ non-
conceptual content.77 Speaks’ distinction is between a kind of content which does
not even have the right kind of form to be brought under concepts—this is ab-
solutely non-conceptual content; and content which is conceptualisable but so far
unconceptualised. The account which I have been arguing for has been one on
which emotions (and perceptual states) need to have contents which are relatively
non-conceptual, but still propositional. Such states have contents which are rela-
tively, but not absolutely non-conceptual. On such an account emotions can be
regarded as rationally assessable, in virtue of their propositional content. (They
may still not be subject to rational control).
10. Conclusion
I have argued that, despite recent developments in the philosophy of perception, the
view that emotions are analogous to perceptual states is one that is still available
to those who think that emotions have propositional content. But it is not one
which is available for free. Advocates of the perceptual view need to take on a
number of other, potentially controversial commitments. They need to be open
to the possibility of a pluralist account of the contents of perception, on which
perceptual states can have contents which are both object-like and proposition-like.
And they also need to accept that the proposition-like contents of emotions can be
non-conceptual.
The idea that emotions have a non-conceptual content is, as I have already noted,
not a new one. However, the role that it plays in my argument is new. To the best
of my knowledge, few advocates of the perceptual analogy have confronted their
views on emotion with objections to the idea that perceptions have propositional
content. So the idea that acknowledging emotions to have non-conceptual content
might play an important role in resisting these objections is not a familiar idea.
Indeed one might regard it as a new and further reason for taking emotions to have
non-conceptual content.
The idea that an advocate of the perceptual view of emotion should accept a
pluralist view of the contents of both perception and emotion is less familiar. It
may, for that reason, seem harder to accept, particularly where the contents of
perception are concerned. Nevertheless it may be worth noting one very obvious
advantage of the view. It is that someone who accepts the perceptual view and
The Contents of Perception and the Contents of Emotion 291
who thinks that emotions can have propositional contents is no longer in the
awkward position of having either to ignore emotions such as love and hate which
seem to be directed at objects or to force them into an unacceptable theoretical
strait-jacket.
This, by itself, strikes me as one very good reason for an advocate of the percep-
tual view to accept the view I have been arguing for here. But whether it will seem
so to others—and whether it will enable them to say everything that an advocate
of the perceptual view might want to say is beyond my power to determine.
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The Contents of Perception and the Contents of Emotion 295
61 Speaks 2005 distinguishes between two senses in which concept might be non-conceptual, which
he names ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ non-conceptuality. Here, I am interested in content which is, in Speaks’
terms ‘relatively non-conceptual’.
62 See Fodor 2008 for one which does not presuppose a Peacockean view of concepts.
63 Peacocke 1986.
64 John McDowell has, famously, denied that we can infer from a perceptual state’s having an
inexpressible content to its having a non-conceptual content (McDowell 1994), suggesting that we
might make use of indexical concepts such as ‘that shade’ and ‘that shape’ in this context. However,
as Dokic (2001) points out, there are empirical reasons for supposing that this will not work—at least
if we suppose, as McDowell seems likely to, that a genuine concept, even an indexical one, must be
one that we are capable of using on more than one occasion. For it seems as though our memory
for shades and colors is not sufficiently good for inner ostensions of this sort to determinately pick
out a particular shade or shape. (We might also wonder whether the sortals ‘shade’ and ‘shape’ have
sufficiently precise identity conditions to do the job). But in any case, the McDowell point seems to
be dialectically ineffective here: how could an argument to the effect that even inexpressible contents
might be non-conceptual be deployed to shore up an argument that presupposes that there cannot be
inexpressible contents?
65 Peacocke 1992 pp77–82.
66 Tye 2006.
67 Peacocke 1992 ibid.
68 Tye 2006.
69 I have stressed the role that taking concepts to be inferential capacities plays in some arguments
for thinking that perceptual states can have non-conceptual contents. So it is worth noticing that it is
not an essential part of all such arguments. For example it does not seem to play an important role in
the argument from ineffability. Furthermore, it is also worth noticing that at least some philosophers,
such as Jerry Fodor, who would firmly reject the view that concepts are inferential capacities still think
there are reasons for believing that some perceptual states may have non-conceptual contents.
70 It’s worth noticing that what is at issue here is not whether there might be a speaker of some
purely hypothetical language who might be able to express the content of a perceptual state like this; in
arguing against the possibility of perceptual states having propositional contents Travis restricts himself
to considering the resources that an actual language—namely English—gives us.
71 Tappolet 2000 Do¨ring 2007, 2009 Gunter 2003, Scarantino and Griffiths 2005.
72 Crane 1992.
73 Tappolet 2000 Do¨ring 2007.
74 Fodor 2008.
75 Fodor 2008.
76 Pugmire 2009.
77 Speaks 2005. It would be nice to be able to illustrate this distinction by giving examples of both
kinds of content. But Speaks pp365–73 argues—convincingly, in my view—that there is little reason to
suppose that there is any content of the latter sort. I have given examples of relatively non-conceptual
content in the course of sections 8 and 9 of this paper.
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